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Abstract: (1) Background: Cross-border venture capital (VC) investments play an important role in 
the scaling up of high-growth companies. However, policymakers worry that foreign VC 
investments transfer the majority of economic activity to the investor country. On the one hand, 
start-ups welcome the foreign capital, expertise, and networks that accompany cross-border 
investments. On the other hand, policymakers are concerned that cross-border investments 
predominantly benefit foreign economies and fail to develop the local entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
This paper describes a framework for how policymakers can develop a set of policies toward cross-
border VC investments. (2) Methods: The paper examines available data and trends about the role 
of cross-border investing, focusing on Europe, Israel, and Canada. Then, the paper explains the 
underlying economic challenges and develops a policy framework. (3) Results: The analysis shows 
that in addition to policies that aim to attract foreign investors, there are also important policies for 
the development of the domestic VC market. The analysis encompasses policies that are both 
financial and non-financial in nature. (4) Conclusions: A core insight for policymakers is to retain a 
balance of initiatives, attracting foreign investors while simultaneously making sure to strengthen 
the country’s domestic VC industry and innovation ecosystem. The mix of policies will adjust as the 
domestic ecosystem matures. 
Keywords: Cross-border venture capital; internationalization; entrepreneurship policy; foreign 
venture capital firms; domestic entrepreneurs 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally venture capital (VC henceforth) was a local industry. Geographic proximity of an 
investor firm to its portfolio company was considered crucial for identifying investment opportunities, 
monitoring, adding value, and achieving higher performance (Devigne, Manigart, Vanacker, & Mulier, 
2018; Makela & Maula, 2006; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). More recently, however, the VC industry has 
experienced international growth (Alhorr, Moore, & Payne, 2008; Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2016; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2009). Foreign investors, attracted by new opportunities and new markets, are 
investing outside their home country at growing rates. This has led to an increase in both the amount 
of foreign investment and the number of international exits by VC-backed companies. Questions 
emerge for policymakers whether these investments predominantly benefit foreign economies, or 
whether they also help to grow the local entrepreneurial ecosystems. The central policy question is: 
Should government policies facilitate cross-border venture capital investments; and, if so, how? 
Policymakers lack a unified framework for analysing the issues associated with cross-border 
venture capital investments. Moreover, a lack of high-quality data and evidence about cross-border VC 
investments impedes making informed policy decisions. In some countries, such as Israel and Canada, 
policymakers have actively encouraged foreign investments, while others, including many European 
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countries, implicitly discourage cross-border financing, or simply lack a clear set of policy guidelines. 
In this paper, we propose a coherent perspective to assess the advantages and disadvantages of cross-
border VC investments. We outline the challenges faced by companies, investors, and policymakers, 
and present a framework for drafting appropriate policy responses.  
This paper does not contribute any original data or new empirical regression analysis. Instead it builds 
on a review of the academic literature (see Devigne et al., 2018), as well as a summary of publicly 
available data, to develop a new framework analysing policy options for cross-border venture 
investing. Section 2 looks at the quantitative and qualitative data about the rise of cross-border 
investing. Section 3 develops a conceptual understanding of the economic challenges of cross-border 
investing. Section 4 develops the main policy analysis. It is followed by a brief conclusion.  
2. Trends in cross-border venture capital investments 
This section outlines what we currently know about cross-border investments. Cross-border VC 
investment is defined as investments from investors located in a different country from the country 
where the portfolio company was founded. In our discussion we mainly talk about VC, but one can 
use a broad definition of this term. Although not our focus and thus excluded from our data, much 
of our analysis also pertains to other forms of early-stage financing, such as angel investing, corporate 
venturing, or crowdfunding. In general, cross-border VC investments make up a non-trivial part of 
the market, with an increasing trend over time. Relative to domestic VC investments, cross-border 
VC investments usually occur at later stages, are associated with larger rounds, larger exits, and with 
more foreign exits (Devigne et al., 2018). 
Our data originates from three major sources. Section 2.1 looks at statistics from industry 
publications, section 2.2 at the empirical academic literature, and section 2.3 at some of the evidence 
available from looking at individual countries. 
2.1. Data from industry publications 
Data about cross-border VC investments remains limited. In this section we provide an overview 
of the available evidence. A useful starting point are large deals (including unicorn deals that receive 
a lot of publicity). In Europe in 2017, there were 17 investment rounds over €100 million, compared 
to 13 rounds in 2016, including the notable €500M investment in Spotify (Dealroomco, 2017). Most of 
these large rounds included foreign investors. In 2017, UK-based Improbable received €502M from 
Japanese investors, Portugal-based Farfetch €397M from Chinese investors, UK-based Deliveroo 
€397M from a round that included US investors, UK-based Truphone €337M from a syndicate that 
included Russian investors, and Germany-based SoundCloud €170M from a syndicate that included 
UK and Singapore investors.1 
Turning to more systematic data from Dealroom.co, we note that US investors contributed 
roughly 26% of funds to the European VC market in 2017, and this amount has increased over time. 
US VC investments in Europe increased from $11.3 billion in 2016 to $12.0 billion in 2017 (Figure 1). 
                                                          
1 To be more specific, Improbable received funding from Japanese SoftBank 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/japan-softbank-improbably-invest-500m-uk-tech-
startup-a7732031.html,  Farfetch from Chinese JD.com: https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/21/jd-com-invests-397m-
into-luxury-marketplace-farfetch-as-part-of-a-new-strategic-partnership/, Deliveroo from a syndicate including 
Fidelity and T. Rowe Price: https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/24/deliveroo-raises-385m/, Truphone from a 
syndicate that included Russian investors: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/03/truphone-raises-338-million-in-
funding-backed-by-roman-abramovich.html, and Soundcloud from  a syndicate of The Raine Group and 
Singapore-based Temasek: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/soundcloud-posted-a-82m-loss-in-2016-
but-took-on-170m-in-investment-last-year/ 
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Figure 1: US investment in Europe by amount invested (€B) (Dealroom.co, 2018). 
In 2017, more than 450 investment rounds in European companies involved US VCs (Table 1). 
The number of deals with US participation has increased more than the amount invested by US 
investors over time, which implies that the average size of these US participations has decreased 
(Table 1; Table 2). Table 1 and Table 2 provide a more detailed breakdown of the data for US, Europe, 
and worldwide VC investment in European companies. 
Table 2 shows that most of VC amount invested in European companies comes from European 
investors (56%, including domestic investors). The US and Canada are the next largest investors by 
dollar invested in Europe (26%) and then Asia (13%). The UK invests more capital outside its own 
country than any other European country (Dealroom.co, 2017). In 2017, investment in the UK grew 
by 87% to €7.1 billion, more than Germany, France, and Sweden combined (Dealroom.co, 2018). 
About 50% of investment into the UK comes from foreign investors (31% from US investors; 22% 
other foreign). Within the UK, foreign investors often fill the scale-up financing gap. In Series E 
rounds, for example, only 25% of investors in the UK come from the UK (Hellmann et al., 2016) 
  
  
 
 Origin of funds by investor location (2017) 
Invest into: 
*HQ location 
UK 
investors 
German 
investors 
France 
investors 
Swedish 
investors 
Spanish 
investors 
Dutch 
investors 
Swiss 
Investors 
Rest of Europe 
investors 
European 
Investors 
Total Europe 817 433 591 241 148 155 99 454 2,650 
UK 588 50 26 9 9 5 12 26 657 
Germany 51 293 24 14 5 11 35 6 345 
France 36 23 505 3 5 5 5 8 531 
Sweden 23 7 -- 182 1 3 2 16 213 
Spain 37 8 11 3 121 6 -- 9 164 
Netherlands 16 13 3 1 1 105 1 3 130 
Switzerland 3 6 3 1 3 2 30 2 45 
Other Europe 63 33 19 28 3 18 14 384 565 
(a) 
Table 1: (a) Number of VC rounds by location of investors and investees (2017) (Dealroom.co, 2018). Most European investment rounds occur domestically. 
Of 817 rounds into European companies involving UK investors, 588 rounds were for UK-based companies. US investors are predominantly interested in the 
UK and Germany. (b) Of 828 total rounds in the UK in 2017, 157 rounds involved a North American (US & Canada) investor. This means roughly 20% of UK 
investment rounds have a US or Canadian investor. Of 828 total rounds in the UK in 2017, 657 rounds involved European investors. This means 79% of all 
UK investment rounds in 2017 had a European investor.  
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  Origin of funds by investor location (2017) 
Invest into: 
*By HQ 
location 
European investors US & Canada investors Asian investors RoW investors Total world investors 
 
Europe US & Canada Asia RoW Total world 
Total Europe 2,650 468 141 224 3,681 
UK 657 157 54 14 828 
Germany 345 59 18 5 417 
France 531 64 12 9 705 
Sweden 213 28 4 2 359 
Spain 164 27 6 8 217 
Netherlands 130 18 4 1 215 
Switzerland 45 13 7 1 85 
Other Europe 565 102 36 184 855 
(b) 
Table 1: (b) Number of VC rounds by location of investors and investees (2017) (Dealroom.co, 2018). Of 828 total rounds in the UK in 2017, 157 rounds 
involved a North American (US & Canada) investor. This means roughly 20% of UK investment rounds have a US or Canadian investor. Of 828 total rounds 
in the UK in 2017, 657 rounds involved European investors. This means 79% of all UK investment rounds in 2017 had a European investor. 
  
  
 
 Origin of funds by investor location (2017) 
Invest into: 
*By HQ location 
UK 
investors 
German 
investors 
France 
investors 
Swedish 
investors 
Spanish 
investors 
Dutch 
investors 
Swiss 
investors 
Rest of Europe 
investors 
European 
Investors 
Europe 22% 9% 10% 4% 2% 3% 2% 4% 56% 
UK 36% 4% 3% 1% 1% 0% 2% 0% 48%  
Germany 13% 23% 6% 2% 1% 2% 5% 0% 51% 
France 13% 6% 51% 0% 0% 4% 2% 0% 77% 
Sweden 12% 9% -- 40% 0% 2% 0% 5% 68% 
Spain 15% 4% 4% 6% 21% 3% -- 0% 53% 
Netherlands 11% 10% 5% 0% 4% 48% 0% -- 78% 
Switzerland 7% 7% 9% 3% 1% 2% 20% -- 48% 
Other Europe 12% 7% 4% 4% 0% 4% 2% 27% 60% 
(a) 
Table 2: (a) Percentage of VC amount contributed by investor and investee location (2017) (Dealroom.co, 2018). 56% of total amount received by European 
companies comes from European VC funds, or $10.9B, into European companies. UK investors contribute 22% of total VC amount received by European 
companies. The UK invests more capital outside its own country than any other country in Europe. Together, the UK and US are responsible for almost half 
of all capital invested into Europe at 22% and 26%, respectively (Dealroom.co, 2018).  
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(b) 
Table 2: (b) Percentage of VC amount contributed by investor and investee location (2017) (Dealroom.co, 2018). Together, the UK and US are responsible for 
almost half of all capital invested into Europe at 22% and 26%, respectively (Dealroom.co, 2018). 
 Origin of funds by investor location (2017) 
Invest into: 
*By HQ location 
European investors US & Canada investors Asian investors RoW investors Total world investors 
Total Europe 56% 26% 13% 5% $19.4 B 
UK 48% 30% 20% 2% $ 7.4 B 
Germany 51% 24% 11% 14% $ 3.1 B 
France 77% 19% 4% 1% $ 2.6 B 
Sweden 68% 27% 3% 2% $1.3 B 
Spain 53% 26% 8% 13% $ 0.9 B 
Netherlands 78% 20% 2% 0% $ 0.6 B 
Switzerland 48% 38% 13% -- $ 0.3 B 
Other Europe 60% 26% 9% 5% $ 3.1 B 
  
  
The countries in Europe that rely most on foreign VCs are Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Spain, 
accounting for over 70% of their VC investments. Figure 2 graphically represents the composition of 
VC invested by individual countries. 
*Assumes rounds with multiple investors are equally allocated. Based on investor HQ location 
**Other foreign mostly other European 
Figure 2: Country origins of investment amounts across European countries (2016). This figure 
is from Dealroom.co data (Dealroom.co, 2017). 
Like Europe, Canada’s VC market is growing. In 2017, total annual VC funding in Canada 
reached $2.7 billion, distributed across 333 deals; total funding increased 7%; deal activity 
decreased 12% but the average deal size increased by 31%, from $8.3 to $10.9 million in 2017 (PwC, 
2018). There were several mega rounds and VC-backed unicorns funded by foreign investors: 
Montreal-based Element AI ($135M from US and international investors), Waterloo-based eSentire 
(from US and other global investors), Toronto-based PointClickCare ($85M from US investors), and 
Ottawa-based Assent Compliance ($32 million from US investors) (Canada, 2018). Foreign VC 
investments in Canada predominantly come from the US, representing 26% of all deals and almost 
50% of the total VC amount invested in Canadian companies (Pitchbook “Canada Breakdown 
Report” 2015; Pitchbook “Canadian PE & VC Breakdown Report” 2017). From 2012 to 2015, the 
total amount invested in deals with US participation by dollar amount steadily increased. Most US 
investments in Canada occur at later stages (BDC Capital, 2017). Canada thus falls in line with the 
global trend of foreign investors focusing on larger, later stage deals. 
Israel also relies heavily on US VC investment, and these investments are increasing. Israeli 
tech companies raised $4.43 billion in 2015, which was roughly 30% more than in 2014. Figure 2 
shows that in 2016, 43% of funding came from US investors. Moreover, VC deals with US 
participation represent 85% of the total amount invested in Israeli VC deals in 2015 (Zemer, 2016). 
US investors invest more VC funds per inhabitant in Israel than they do at home. Whereas US VC 
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firms invested $250 per capita domestically in 2017, US VC firms invested $368 per capita in Israel 
(Dealroom.co, 2017). By comparison, US VC investments per inhabitant in Sweden and the UK were 
$136 and $120, respectively. These two countries were next highest in levels of US investment per 
capita abroad. 
Clearly, the US is a major player in international VC investments. However, in Europe, other 
foreign investors are contributing rapidly, such as the UK, Germany, and France (Dealroom.co, 
2018). Moreover, there is a global trend that Asian investors, especially Chinese are increasing 
investing not only in the US, but also in Europe, Israel, and Canada (Dealroom.co, 2017; Huang, 
2018; Lee, 2018; Weinland, 2018). 
2.2. Empirical evidence from academic papers 
Most of the academic literature on cross-border VC investments address: (1) which countries 
invest across borders and where; (2) the factors that influence the decision of VC firms to invest 
across borders; (3) and the effects on company performance of cross-border investments. 
The academic literature notes that several country-specific characteristics are associated with 
an increase in the amount of foreign VC investment between two countries, including geographical 
distance, common language, and colonial ties (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). Firms enter foreign 
markets (1) based on the magnitude of trade ties, (2) based on the presence of transnational 
communities (i.e., links through migration), and (3) with high numbers of domestic collaborators 
who already operate in the new market (previous investment collaborations) (Guler & Guillén, 
2010). The size of the private equity industries in two countries increases the number of cross-
border transactions between those two countries (Tykvová & Schertler, 2008, 2011). The work of Gu 
and Lu (2011) and Sung and Liang (2014) establish the linkages between inward and outward cross-
border venture investments. Moreover, trust among nations also affects international investment 
decisions (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2016). 
Intellectual property protection and legal institutions are also drivers of cross-border 
investments at the country-level. According to work by Groh, Liechtenstein, and Canela (2008), the 
level of protection of property rights in a country is the dominant concern for making cross-border 
investment decisions. Another study shows that countries with better legal protection have more 
active investors that exercise more corporate governance (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2009). 
Related to this, the work of Chen and Sun (2019) explains how financial contracts and governance 
practices from cross-border investments influence the development the domestic institutional 
legitimation and legalization of these practices. Furthermore, the work of Sun, Chen, Sunny, and 
Chen (2018) explains the broader process of venture capital can foster the innovation ecosystem. 
There are many firm-specific drivers for cross-border investments, both at the level of VC firms 
and portfolio companies. Higher quality of management and skills of local entrepreneurs are 
associated with an increase in cross-border investing (Groh & Liechtenstein, 2011; Guler & Guillén, 
2010). The international experience of the management team is also strongly associated with foreign 
investments (Hursti & Maula, 2008). Research shows that local VC firms typically invest first, 
followed by foreign VC firms in later rounds (Mäkelä & Maula, 2008). Foreign VC firms located in a 
venture's target market of internationalization can be valuable for the venture by legitimizing the 
unknown new venture in that market (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005). Certain third-party firms also affect 
the propensity of cross-border VC investing. The direct and indirect network ties of financial 
intermediaries is associated with cross-border investments (Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2014). 
For VC firms, the decision to invest abroad depends on the returns from investment. Some 
studies find that, after controlling for portfolio company quality and VC firm reputation, 
international VC firms are less likely than purely domestic VC firms to have successful exits 
(Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 2013). The mechanism for why such evidence exists is linked to the 
liabilities of foreignness research, which shows information asymmetries and more limited resource 
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transfers restrict the success of cross-border investments (Devigne, Manigart, & Wright, 2016). In 
addition, compared to domestic investors, foreign investors are associated with lower escalation of 
commitment and higher willingness to terminate ventures (Devigne et al., 2016). 
By contrast, several other studies find evidence that foreign investors are associated with more 
exits, such as an increased likelihood for IPOs and M&As, faster exits, and higher valuations 
(Bertoni & Groh, 2014; Chahine & Saade, 2011). The relationship between foreign investors and exit 
performance therefore remains inconclusive. There is also a problem with establishing clear causal 
links, and the role of selection effects. The work by Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2009), for 
example, shows how performance differentials of foreign investments can be largely explained by 
the selection of deals.  
A few studies look at measures of company performance other than exit. Devigne et al. (2013) 
shows that foreign VC firms are associated with lower short run sales growth, but higher medium-
term sales growth. Companies backed by a syndicate with both domestic and foreign VC investors 
outperform all other VC combinations in terms of an increase of sales, total assets, and employment 
(Chemmanur, Hull, & Krishnan, 2016). Overall we note that while the academic literature provides 
useful guidance on the drivers of cross-border investing, the question of relative investment 
performance remains largely unresolved. 
2.3. Country experiences 
The role of foreign investors differs by country. In this section we consider four country case 
studies that are particularly revealing: Israel, Canada, the UK, and France. 
2.3.1. Israel 
For decades, the military played a unique role in developing the VC market in Israel. The first 
limited partnership VC fund in Israel, Athena Venture Partners, was founded in 1985 by the former 
Chief of Staff of the Israel Air Force and two VC experts from the US. At the time, Israel already 
hosted several international R&D Centres, including major technology firms like Intel. To cement its 
position as a leading innovation centre, the Israeli government passed regulations in the 1980s to 
encourage further relocation of R&D centres. This, along with tax cuts in the 1980s and the ICT 
technology boom of the 1990s led to a local entrepreneur boom in Israel. In 1987, the cancellation of 
the Lavi fighter-plane mega-project also inundated the domestic labour market with an influx of 
engineers and ex-military employees (Isenberg, 2011). As the local entrepreneurs could not find the 
financial resources at home, the government set up a programme to jump-start its local VC industry 
in 1993, called YOZMA I. A unique aspect of this programme was that it offered attractive tax 
incentives to foreign venture-capital investments in Israel. It also promised to double any investment 
with funds from the government. YOZMA I created ten funds that were led by private sponsors, each 
capitalized with $20 million. A few years later, along with co-investment from prominent American, 
European, and Israeli investors, the Israeli government created YOZMA II and YOZMA III. The 
YOZMA programmes created professionally managed funds that contributed not only venture 
capital but also recruited senior managers, designed business strategies, raised additional capital 
rounds, and attracted strategic and financial investors to its portfolio companies. YOZMA funds 
managed more than $220 million and made direct investments in approximately 50 portfolio 
companies. From 1991 to 2000, the number of companies launched using Israeli venture funds rose 
from 100 to 800. Israel’s information-technology revenues rose from $1.6 billion to $12.5 billion. By 
1999, Israel ranked second only to the United States in invested private-equity capital as a share of 
GDP (Gilder, 2009). By 2018, Israel ranked first.  
Today, Israel remains a hub for entrepreneurial ventures in all sectors. It attracts 15% of the 
world’s VC investments in cyber-security, as well as other significant investments in agricultural and 
water technology, artificial intelligence, health services, and financial technology (“Startup nation or 
left-behind nation? Israel’s economy is a study in contrasts,” 2017). In 2017, Israel had one start-up 
for every 1,400 people. These companies, many of which are founded by serial Israeli entrepreneurs, 
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also raise large international investment rounds, including Via ($250m), Lemonade ($120m), 
Cybereason ($100m), Vayyar ($45m), Airobotics ($32.5m), and Monday.com ($25m). 
Israel is widely considered the poster child of success for building an innovation ecosystem. This 
success was clearly aided by policies that attracted foreign investments (Razin, 2018). It is 
nevertheless important to note that with 8.5 million people, Israeli is nearly 40 times smaller in 
population than the US, and almost 90 times smaller in population than Europe. Because of its small 
size, Israeli has close interpersonal and inter-business networks to rely on. The interconnectedness of 
Israeli networks in the ecosystem has been attributed to the success of entrepreneurship in Israel. For 
example, as far back as 1987, MIT Professor Ed Roberts founded a mentoring network of 50 Boston-
based Jewish technology entrepreneurs called the Technion Entrepreneurial Associates (Isenberg, 
2011). 
However, despite its early policy actions to attract foreign investors, there are also downsides to 
being a “Startup Nation.” Few of these ventures scale up within Israel. Instead, most Israeli start-ups 
are acquired by foreign companies. Several of these foreign exits involved multi-billion dollars 
acquisitions. Waze, a community-based traffic and navigation app developed near Tel Aviv in 2008, 
was sold to Google for $1.3 billion. Mobileye, vehicular anti-collision software developed in 
Jerusalem in 1999, was sold to Intel for $15.3 billion (Bordo, 2018). As Israeli founders and employees 
move abroad, this adversely affects local employment and economic growth (Duruflé, 2018). 
2.3.2. Canada 
The venture capital industry in Canada started in the early nineties and grew rapidly during the 
decade with a strong support of governments (direct funds and tax credit to retail funds2), financial 
institutions (direct investment and some indirect investment) and pension funds (direct and indirect 
investment). There were relatively few private independent funds. 
This rapid growth of the VC industry supported the emergence of first generations of tech 
entrepreneurs and start-ups. However, after the crash of the tech bubble, returns proved to be very 
negative for all classes of investors: government and government supported funds as well as private 
sector.3 It appeared that overall the industry had not started with the right profile of investors, nor a 
set of best practices to replicate the success of the US industry (Duruflé, Hellmann, & Wilson, 2018). 
This led to a reset: most financial institutions and pension funds left the asset class; LSVCCs were 
phased out outside Quebec and in Quebec they left early stage direct VC investment and turned to 
indirect investment; provincial governments shifted from direct investment to indirect investment; 
pension funds that remained in the asset class because they had economic development objectives 
did the same; the federal government, through BDC, maintained a direct investment arm but in 
parallel increased its indirect investment capacities and later supported the set up of fund-of-funds  
dedicated to invest in VC funds through the Venture Capital Action Plan (VCAP) and the Venture 
Capital Catalyst Initiative (VCCI).  
All these initiatives were based on the consensus that the objective was to support the 
development of a strong and self-sustainable Canadian private sector VC industry. This required 
nurturing and selecting the right profile of managers, adopting industry best practices that had been 
largely developed in the US, and attract leading US funds for their capital, networks and expertise. 
During the first phase of development (1990-2005), the dominant position was that government 
support should be predominantly, if not strictly, directed to Canadian companies and Canadian VC 
funds. After the reset, this position evolved: in order to benefit from the foreign (mostly US) capital, 
                                                          
2 These funds supported by tax credits to retail investors were called Labor Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations (LSVCC). 
3 The pooled average for the private independent funds was not any better than for government funds and 
LSVCCs. However, the dispersion of returns was much larger for private sector funds. There was a first quartile 
of private sector funds that had acceptable returns, but most private sector funds had poor to very poor returns 
(see Duruflé, 2006). 
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expertise and networks, government policies should not limit cross-border investing, nor should they 
limit Canadian VC funds to co-invest with leading US funds, neither in Canada nor in the US. 
To this end, important fiscal hurdles that limited investment by foreign funds in Canada, 
(especially Section 116 of the Income Tax Act) were removed. Moreover, government supported 
fund-of-funds programmes were designed not only to fund local managers but also to attract foreign 
investors. Conditions were that foreign recipients would open a significant office in Canada and that 
enough funds would be invested in Canada. For this a portfolio approach was taken that required 
some multiple (less that 2) of the government allocation to be invested in Canadian companies. 
The impact of these measures was far from immediate but over a twelve-year period, significant 
improvements have been registered. Overall VC investment in Canada have surged. Foreign 
investment now represents more than 50% of total VC investment in Canada. VC inflows to Canada 
are larger that outflows. Top international funds and fund-of-funds (mostly from the US) have 
opened offices in Canada. A group of leading Canadian VC managers is now emerging, the size of 
their funds is growing, and they are becoming increasingly recognized in the US and beyond. 
Importantly, returns in the Canadian VC industry have improved, and leading Canadian funds are 
now able to raise most of their funding from private sector investors. 
As in Israel, there is a growing concern that very few Canadian VC backed companies scale up 
in Canada and that the large role played by foreign investors may increase the probability of 
promising companies moving South of the border or being acquired (too early) by foreign companies. 
The thinking presently is that the best ways to address these issues are (i) to strengthen the 
Canadian VC industry so that Canadian VC funds can keep a lead position in the investment 
syndicate and influence the outcome for the company and (ii) to strengthen the ecosystem so that 
companies find the right environment to grow in Canada. 
Regarding the first point, government supported fund and fund-of-funds programmes have 
now an explicit priority to fund larger, stronger and more experienced Canadian VC funds. Several 
of them have set up co-investment programmes to back underlying Canadian funds investing in large 
rounds of promising Canadian companies. Supporting scale up companies is one of the main 
objectives of the latest VCCI programme at the federal level. Regarding the second point, training 
programmes for CEOs of scale up companies have been set up and initiatives such as the Innovation 
Supercluster Initiative are being deployed to link emerging companies with larger corporations 
(Duruflé, 2018). 
2.3.3. The United Kingdom 
In Europe, the UK leads in cross-border VC investments. The UK has long been a hub for 
European VC investors and start-ups. Contributing to this history is the fact that the UK attracts 
English-speaking investors from the US. London is a European financial centre, and the UK 
government has longstanding programmes for developing start-ups and its domestic base. Several 
of these programmes are now run by the British Business Bank (BBB), such as the Enterprise Capital 
fund (investments of £330M), the VC Catalyst fund (investments of £145M), and the Angel Co-
investment fund (investments of £145M). 
The BBB does not have direct policies targeting foreign VC investors, although several of its 
programmes are accessible to foreign investors investing in UK companies. At the same time, UK 
Trade & Investment, a government department, is actively trying to attract foreign investors, 
including for early stage venture deals.  
The BBB also aims to increase the transparency of its domestic VC market by improving the 
quality and accessibility of investment information about the UK. Closely related, the British Private 
Equity & Venture Capital Association recently presented research on European venture returns, 
which suggests that Europe is outperforming the US in terms of internal rates of return (IRRs), strong 
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unicorn exits, and lower entry valuations.4 After many years of underperformance, at least parts of 
the European venture capital market now appear to generate sustainable returns. Efforts to provide 
transparent returns data, and to disseminate their message, are likely to help Europe attract more 
foreign VC investment. 
2.3.4. France 
Public institutions play a major role in developing France’s ecosystem for VC investors. In recent 
years Bpifrance, the French development bank, has focused on an integrated investment strategy. It 
manages an entire family of funds and fund-of-funds to invest in young French companies. It keeps 
a minority position in the invested funds, sharing the same rights as other investors (“pari passu”). 
The goal is to attract private investors to these VC funds to share the risks and help to grow the 
ecosystem.   
Since the 1990s Bpifrance has launched more than 10 fund-of-funds. These funds are 
predominantly dedicated to VC funds in later stage ventures and balanced stages, although two 
programmes were exclusively dedicated to seed funds. Bpifrance has invested an additional €2 billion 
in over 130 VC funds, including 50 seed funds and 80 later stage and balanced funds, jointly with 
other private investors. Bpifrance also manages direct funds to cover company development stages 
for which the supply of private funds is lacking (Acevedo et al., 2016). Thus, government agencies 
are the biggest investors in French VC funds today. 
In 2017, France overtook the UK in the amount of fundraising. French VC funds raised €2.7 
billion (£2.4 billion), compared with €2.3 billion in the UK (Dealroom.co, 2017). This is the first time 
France has raised more venture capital money than the UK. As a country’s VC market develops, this 
has implications for the level and direction of cross-border investment activity and the role of policy 
in mitigating the risks and amplifying the advantages. However, it appears that on average the 
performance of French VC funds is still inferior to the performance of UK and US funds (Acevedo et 
al., 2016; Autorité des Marchés Financiers, 2014). 
Because France has a smaller but growing VC ecosystem, French policymakers are working to 
attract non-French funds directly by investing in international partners that are already working with 
French funds and by ensuring these international partners remain paired with local funds. In this 
way, the international partners can learn more about the local entrepreneurial ecosystem in France. 
This also gives Bpifrance confidence that its own investment mandates are fulfilled. Bpifrance already 
has an agreement with KfW (Germany) to fulfil this objective of building pan-European funds 
(Duruflé, 2018). 
In addition, France is also working to create a French-China-US GP. One team will be in China, 
one in Silicon Valley, and one in France. This initiative is fully cross-border integrated, with a goal of 
sourcing value-adding companies across those geographies. The main purpose is to attract the best 
teams in the market, create value by developing start-ups, and providing an international outlook 
from the outset.  
3. Framework for understanding cross-border venture capital investments 
How can companies, investors, and policymakers make sense of the challenges associated with 
cross-border VC investments? In this paper we develop a framework for policymakers that 
conceptualizes the advantages and disadvantages of cross-border investments. The framework is 
designed to help policymakers create interventions that are the appropriate for their ecosystem and 
their policy goals. 
3.1. Advantages & disadvantages of cross-border VC investments 
Policymakers can consider cross-border investments with respect to two levels of analysis: 
transaction-level and ecosystem-level. At the transaction level, the question we ask is: “How do 
entrepreneurs and VC investors decide whether and when to engage in cross border investing?” At 
                                                          
4 From discussions with representatives of The British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association 
 7 of 24 
 
the ecosystem level we ask: “What is the effect of cross border venture investments on the local 
ecosystem?” 
With this, we now examine the advantages and disadvantages for two different stakeholders: 
investors, which are the VC firms, and entrepreneurs, who operate VC-backed companies. Figure 3 
summarizes the main advantages and disadvantages of cross-border investments. It distinguishes 
between a transaction level and an ecosystem level. It also distinguishes between (i) the domestic 
companies and their ecosystem and (ii) the foreign investors and their ecosystem.  
 
Perspective Advantages  Disadvantages  
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Transaction level 
• Funding 
• Networks 
• Expertise 
• Distance 
• Investor lack commitment and 
local understanding 
Ecosystem level 
• Grow ecosystem 
• Role models 
• Global connectivity 
• Crowding out local investors 
• Company relocation 
• Brain drain 
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  Transaction level 
• Investment 
opportunities 
• Networks 
• Barriers and costs 
• Requires learning and focus 
Ecosystem level 
• Inflow of foreign 
entrepreneurs enrich 
ecosystem diversity 
• Drain on financial resources 
 
Figure 3: This figure compares the advantages and disadvantages of cross-border investing. 
 
The direct effects of cross-border investment occur at the transaction level. Foreign investors are 
looking for attractive investment opportunities. Local companies may receive lower valuations, 
especially compared to Silicon Valley. In addition, foreign VCs might identify local companies with 
potential exit options in their home market where the exit markets might be more liquid than in the 
local market.  For a foreign VC fund, investing in local companies can also help the firm to diversify 
its investment portfolio, and possibly to differentiate itself from other purely domestic competitors. 
Moreover, cross-border investments allow VC firms to pursue a “global specialist strategy.” They 
focus on a limited number of sectors but use the cross-border element to achieve the necessary scale. 
At the same time, VC firms investing abroad face a host of business and regulatory challenges. 
Ownership restrictions or high tax burdens can hinder a foreign VC firm’s ability to invest cross-
border. Within Europe, for example, there are 27 different national investment regulations. A VC firm 
that wants to invest in several European countries will face considerable difficulties acquiring all the 
required country-specific knowledge regarding investments and taxes. In addition, making foreign 
investment requires constant learning, and a certain level of commitment. There is a fixed cost 
element to this, making it particularly difficult for smaller VC firms.  
From the company perspective, accepting foreign venture investors holds the promise of access 
to capital, networks, and expertise. Companies in underdeveloped VC markets are particularly keen 
to access such resources. Companies seeking a specific sector expertise or network, including strategic 
partners or customers, can benefit from foreign investors that are more specialized and have larger 
market reach. A key role of a VC firm is to provide its portfolio companies with expertise and 
networks to prepare for exit, either going IPO or getting acquired. Foreign investors may provide 
access to foreign corporations, which may generate better exit opportunities for the company. At the 
same time, there can be real disadvantages of accepting funding from foreign investors. Being located 
far away, foreign investors may not stay in close communication. If they do, the foreign investors 
may lack proper understanding of the local ecosystem and provide the wrong type of advice. There 
is also a question about the level of commitment to the company and the country, and whether 
foreign investors give up earlier in downtimes.30 
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At the ecosystem level cross-border investment can have several indirect effects. An ecosystem 
comprises other entrepreneurs, investors, and all supporting entities that surround the initial cross-
border investment. Ecosystems tend to be highly interactive and networked, driven by information 
and thick market effects (Pierrakis & Saridakis, 2019). 
From the perspective of the investor country, an investment abroad can be viewed as an 
investment lost to the local economy, i.e., it may be viewed as a drain on financial resources locally. 
However, a potential advantage is the inflow of new entrepreneurial ideas, and possibly the inflow 
of entrepreneurs who are relocating. Indeed, some investors make it a funding requirement that the 
entrepreneurs relocate to the investor country.  
From the perspective of the investee company’s country, there are several issues at stake. As 
long as the company remains in its home country, the ecosystem effects are likely to be positive. 
However, the big concern is precisely that the company relocates to the investor country, possibly at 
the time of investment, possibly at a later stage, and possibly also at exit through a foreign acquisition. 
Things get even more complicated when we consider the dynamic flow of entrepreneurs who leave 
but sometimes come back at a later point in time. Section 3.2 elaborates on this further. An additional 
concern with foreign investors is that they may crowd out local investors. This could slow the growth 
of local VC markets and entrepreneurial ecosystems.  
In this context it is worth noting that foreign investors typically play different roles in VC deals 
than domestic investors. Broadly speaking, there are four relevant steps to the investment process: 
deal sourcing, deal structuring, deal managing, and exit. Domestic investors are particularly good at 
deal sourcing and deal structuring, as they are more familiar with the local competitive landscape. 
However, once companies are ready for the scale-up stage, domestic investors often lack the funds 
and expertise to grow these companies. This is where foreign investors specializing in scale-ups can 
play an important role. Foreign investors, especially from the US, tend to be larger, and therefore 
more able to contribute large funds at the scale-up stage. In addition to capital, foreign investors also 
provide connections to foreign markets and potential foreign acquirers (mostly US acquirers), which 
provide exit options that may be unavailable to smaller, localized investors. 
3.2. Flow of talent across borders 
One of the central concerns with cross-border investments is their effect on talent and company 
mobility. Do they encourage individual and/or companies to relocate? If so, when and how? There 
are four inflection points in the investment cycle where talent and companies might move, at (i) pre-
investment; (ii) investment; (iii) exit; and (iv) post-exit. 
Concerning the first point, brain drain comes at the very beginning and relates to the choices of 
individuals and their career aspirations, before a company is formed. Concerning the second point, 
company relocation occurs after the formation of the company. Brain drain and company relocation 
are central concerns to policy makers trying to build a local ecosystem. One practical challenge is that 
it is difficult to obtain reliable data. Entrepreneurial brain drain is hard to distinguish from broader 
patterns of migration, since it occurs prior to a company being formed. As for company relocation, 
the usual data sources, such as national registers, are highly deficient too, since they typically cannot 
capture what happens to the company once it leaves the national boundaries.  
The third point about exit concerns the later periods of company development. This is often the 
most visible involvement of foreign countries. It makes the news when successful local companies 
get acquired by foreign entities, critical voices can often be heard. A recent case in point was the 
acquisition by Softbank of Arm, a successful UK company.5 The final point concerning brain regain 
is arguably the least obvious. This involves a host of activities that happen after a successful foreign 
exit. Founders may bring capital, talent, and networks back to their home country. The recycling of 
expertise from successful entrepreneurs who become angels and pass on their expertise to the next 
generation of entrepreneurs is also valuable (Hellmann and Thiele, 2018). There is some empirical 
                                                          
5 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36827769  
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evidence that suggests that the emigration of talent can lead to brain regain (Batista, Lacuesta, & C. 
Vicente, 2007; Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2001). 
How much relocation actually happens is largely a function of how strong the domestic 
ecosystem is. In a weak ecosystem, entrepreneurs are eager to leave, and have little reason to return. 
In a stronger ecosystem there are fewer reasons to leave and more reasons to return. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs in stronger ecosystems have more power to negotiate with foreign investors and may 
find it easier to resist calls for relocation by foreign investors. 
Another way of looking at the relocation challenge is through Startup Genome’s ecosystem 
lifecycle model (Startup Genome, 2017). As long as ecosystems are in activation and early 
globalization phase, they lose talent and resources. However, once they pass to the globalisation 
phase they attract resources. Logically, the best set of policies are policies that accelerate the move to 
the globalization phase: inject global know-how, increase global connectedness and accelerate top 
start-ups. This is one of the key reasons why a coherent policy approach is not limited to attracting 
foreign investors, but also seeks to strengthen the domestic ecosystem at the same time.  
According to the London-based investment firm Atomico, there are three phases of founder 
mobility.6 In the first phase, which is what policymakers often remember from the early 1990s, 
founders in Europe, Canada, or Israel moved to the US and were simply asked to relocate (primarily 
to Silicon Valley) by their foreign investors. In the second phase, founders no longer need to relocate 
to the US; rather, they consider moving to a larger local hub in Europe, mainly London. In the third 
phase the strengths of regional hubs in Europe increasingly allow start-up founders to stay in their 
home region, often in larger country hubs such as Berlin or Paris, but occasionally even in smaller 
towns. According to Atomico, Europe is currently somewhere between the second and third phase. 
4. Policy options 
Given the varied country experiences, there cannot be a prescriptive, one-size-fits all policy that 
perfectly balances domestic versus foreign VC investments. However, in this section we consider 
how policymakers can think systematically about the role of cross-border VC investments. 
4.1. Rationale for public support of cross-border VC 
There is a set of core arguments about the rationale for government support of venture capital. 
VC investments support innovation, employment, and productivity growth (J. A. Brander, Du, & 
Hellmann, 2015; Lerner, 2010). Many factors lead to market imperfections and failures when it comes 
to financing entrepreneurial ventures. Start-ups are particularly difficult to assess given their short 
history and intangible assets. This makes assessing a small company’s need for funds and the 
potential financial returns difficult and costly (Kraemer-Eis & Lang, 2012). Asymmetries of 
information surrounding start-ups thus generate a level of uncertainty for investors that can lead to 
suboptimal funding levels. A large economic literature examines problems of agency theory and 
credit rationing (Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 1985; Jaffee & Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). All of those 
can be used to justify public intervention. However, their benefits always have to be weighed against 
the costs of government intervention, especially the risks of government failures. In the European 
context additional complicating factors are the fragmented national borders, disparate legal systems, 
cultural disparity regarding risk taking, and the risk of double taxation (Wilson, 2015; Tykvová, 
Borell, & Kroencke, 2012). 
These core rationales for government support of VC investments need to be extended in our 
context, to consider the unique challenges posed by cross-border VC investing. The question is not 
merely whether government want to support venture capital, but whether they want to support 
foreign venture capital. There are several debates that feed into this.  
                                                          
6 This section is based on conversations with Atomico. Atomico is a leading international technology investment 
firm headquartered in London. Atomico’s founder and CEO is Niklas Zennström, who co-founded Skype and 
Kazaa. 
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First, there is the question of whether government should encourage or discourage foreign 
ownership. In practice, government-sponsored VC funds, such as the British Business Bank in the 
UK, Bpifrance or the Business Development Bank of Canada, are bound by their mandates, and are 
under constant political scrutiny, being monitored on where they allocate public funds. These 
mandates sometime directly or indirectly limit investment in foreign funds or foreign companies by 
funds or funds of funds that receive public funds directly or indirectly. This is a challenge for foreign 
investors looking to co-invest in companies receiving public funds. It may also limit the choices of 
domestic companies receiving public funds.  
There are several other issues that make foreign ownership politically problematic. It is clearly 
difficult for governments to control foreign investors, not to mention their governments. Foreign 
entities may decide to take decisions that undermine the domestic economy without bearing much 
of the consequences. There is also the possibility that foreign investors are subjected to their own 
domestic regulations, which then impact their company investments abroad. Finally, there is the 
recent rise of economic nationalism that poses a challenge for foreign investments. Beyond a rational 
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of foreign ownership, there is often recourse to a 
simplistic argument that foreign ownership is undesirable by itself. 
Overall, we note that even though there are some solid reasons for governments to support 
venture capital investments, including from foreign investors, in practice there are also ways that 
governments can implicitly limit these investments. As a consequence, it is important to map out the 
broad policy options available for policymakers to consider. In the next subsection, we identify ten 
key policy options policies that address ways to build a strong domestic base and attract foreign 
investors at the same time. In principle, these policy options are available to most policymakers, 
although there is no strong consensus yet on which policies are most effective, nor under what 
circumstances they are more or less effective. 
4.2. Policy options 
Figure 4 provides an overview of what we consider the ten most important policy options 
relevant in practice. It uses the two levels of analysis from the framework in Figure 2, namely the 
transaction and ecosystem level. In addition, it distinguishes between two policy goals: strengthening 
the domestic VC market and attracting foreign investors. Note that the boundaries within this 
framework are not strict. Some policies may have effects both at the transaction and ecosystem level, 
or they may help to strengthen the domestic base as well as attract foreign investors. 
Level Objective # Policy option 
Transaction 
level 
Building domestic base 
1 Tax credits 
2 Funding programmes 
Attracting foreign investors 
3 Open up tax credits 
4 Open up funding programmes 
Ecosystem 
level 
Building domestic base 
5 Sectoral focus 
6 Attracting talent 
7 Human capital development 
Attracting foreign investors 
8 Harmonization 
9 Networking 
10 Transparency 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of public policies towards cross-border investments. 
Policy option #1 looks at tax credits, which are transaction-level policies meant to strengthen 
domestic companies. There are many different types of tax credits, including company tax credits 
(such as for R&D), investment tax credits (typically a percentage of qualifying investment amounts), 
or capital gains relief (OECD Publishing, 2018). There is a heathy debate about the desirability and 
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effectiveness of such tax credit policies, but there is an emerging consensus that a reasonable level of 
tax support helps to foster local innovation ecosystems. 
Policy option #2 concerns VC funding policies, which are another example of policies for 
strengthening the domestic ecosystem. They include a variety of government initiatives that motivate 
private investors to create VC funds to support local companies, from young start-ups to more mature 
scale-up companies. Examples include the European Investment Fund’s venture capital programmes, 
(parts of) the European Commission's Capital Markets Union Action Plan, programmes funded by 
British Business Banks and Bpifrance or the Venture Capital Action Plan (VCAP) and the Venture 
Capital Catalyst initiative (VCCI) in Canada. Their effectiveness also remains a matter of debate, but 
in Europe there is a broad consensus that a reasonable implementation of such government 
programmes helped to stabilize and grow the European VC industry (J. A. Brander et al., 2015; L. M. 
Brander et al., 2010; Lerner, 2010; Prencipe, 2017; Signore & Torfs, 2017). 
While policies #1 & #2 are meant to help the domestic ecosystem to develop, on their own they 
do not attract foreign investors. This is because the usual design of these programmes focused on 
domestic investors. Opening them up to foreign investors has the potential of increasing their 
economic impact. Yet doing so is far from trivial in practice, let us understand the main challenges.  
Consider policy option #3, which foresees opening up investment tax credits to foreign 
investments. The economic logic is simple: if there are economic benefits to incentivizing certain 
investments, then this should be true irrespective of the location of the investor. In practice, however, 
this is politically sensitive. Domestic tax credits are not universally popular within their domestic 
context, and there is a general reluctance to offer foreign investors the same subsidies as domestic 
investors. Another important limitation is that foreign investors typically do not have tax liabilities 
to offset. This can be an issue with investment credits (such as the UK’s EIS/SEIS system) but would 
not be an issue with capital gains tax credits. It can also be addressed by making tax credits directly 
refundable– this approach is currently used in places such as British Columbia or Minnesota.  
Policy option #4 asks for domestic programmes (discussed under policy option #2) to also be 
accessible to foreign investors. In the case of funding programmes this means allowing foreign GPs 
to gain access to the funding offered by the government as an LP. If all the foreign GPs were to do 
was take the money and invest it elsewhere, then this would clearly not generate any domestic 
economic benefits (although it might still generate good financial returns). The government’s intent 
is clearly that the GPs (domestic or foreign) invest the majority of the money in the domestic economy. 
This suggests using rules about the minimum amount of domestic (or equivalently maximum 
amount foreign) investment allowable in a fund. Currently some government programmes have 
introduced such rules. The British Business Bank, for example, requires all of the funds to invest at 
least twice as much in the UK as its share of the fund (which is well below 50% of the total fund, thus 
making this rule feasible).  Similar rules also apply to Canada, such as the investments under the 
VCAP and VCCI programme, as well as the BDC. 
 The four policy options considered so far, all address financial incentives at the transactional 
level. The remainder of the policy options operate at the ecosystems level. Policies #5 - #10 are non-
financial in nature but affect the connections that local entrepreneurs and investors have access to 
within their own ecosystem, as well as how they connect to foreign investors. 
Policy option #5 looks at sector specialization. Governments have some leeway on which 
technologies and sectors to favour depending on the countries’ industrial policies. To begin with, 
government play an important role in promoting basic science and applied R&D (Klette, Møen, and 
Griliches, 2000). Policy makers have their own preferences about what sectors should be favoured 
and what policies can be used for that purpose (Vuong, 2018). Related to this, governments promote 
centres of excellence in a variety of ways. The economic rationale can often be to focus innovation 
efforts on a few select areas where the ecosystem has a chance to compete on a global basis. The 
Canadian Innovation Superclusters Initiative is an example of this type of initiative.7 The benefit with 
                                                          
7 Innovation clusters are dense area of business activity containing a critical mass of large and small companies, 
post-secondary and other research institutions that act as engines of growth. Superclusters build on the 
advantages of a cluster via stronger connections, a long-term competitive advantage, and global brand 
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respect to foreign VC investments is that a company (or country) has a stronger bargaining position 
when part of a local centre of excellence. The likelihood of being asked to relocate the company is 
considerably lower, since the local ecosystem is already world class. More generally, the negotiating 
dynamics are entirely different if companies in the ecosystem are able to attract competitive bids from 
multiple foreign investors, as opposed to being at the mercy of a single foreign investor. The key 
insight for policy option #5 is that a country or region may be in a weak bargaining position in one, 
but in a strong bargaining position in another sector, depending on where its comparative advantages 
lie. 
Policy option #6 focuses on labour market policies, especially immigration laws, as well as efforts 
to reconnect with successful expat entrepreneurs. Policymakers often emphasize the negative by-
products of foreign investments on the ecosystem, in terms of brain drain. However, merely 
bemoaning the loss of talent is hardly useful. Most legal approaches of preventing brain drain are 
both ineffective and ethically questionable. The challenge is therefore to devise policies that attract 
(and possible regain) talent. One of the reasons of Silicon Valley’s success is the influx of immigrants 
(Saxenian, 2002). In the US, 56% of the most highly valued technology companies, along with 1.7 
million employees, were founded by first- or second-generation Americans (Meeker, 2018). Policy 
initiatives aimed to attract immigrant entrepreneurs (e.g., the White House Startup America initiative 
and Start-up Visa Programme in Canada) can strengthen the domestic entrepreneurial environment.  
From a European perspective, there is an ongoing challenge of reforming labour market and 
increasing labour mobility within Europe. Another less studied question is how to reconnect with 
successful entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that left for other countries, such as the US. The most 
important fact here is the virtual absence of any organized efforts to do this. By contrast, in Canada, 
the C-100 is widely considered a useful (albeit arguably still insufficient) effort to reconnect successful 
Canadian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley with the Canadian innovation ecosystem.8 The conjecture 
is that relatively simple initiatives by governments and private actors could help to reinvigorate the 
interest of successful entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to reconnect with the countries they 
originally came from.  
Ecosystem-level policies can strengthen the entrepreneurial human capital in the ecosystem, as 
well as create a supportive environment to retain top entrepreneurial talent. Policy option #7 looks at 
policies for investing in enterprise training and education at various levels (Duruflé, 2018). For 
example, the Invest Europe’s “Foundation for Venture Capital Investment Professionals” is a training 
programme designed for early-career practitioners to learn about the different milestones and 
processes in private equity investment. Universities and technical colleges also play a large role in 
educating potential entrepreneurs and supporting emerging student entrepreneurs (Duruflé, 2018; 
Papayannakis, Kastelli, Damigos, & Mavrotas, 2008; Policies for Seed and Early Stage Finance, 2013; 
Twaalfhoven & Wilson, 2004; Wilson, Vyakarnam, Volkmann, Mariotti, & Rabuzzi, 2009). 
Ecosystem-level policies to strengthen the domestic base can target domestic companies, as well 
as individuals. Some initiatives that strengthen the start-up ecosystem include the European 
Commission’s Innovation Radar Platform, which is a database of ventures designed to help broker 
contact between EU-funded innovators and investors who can help them commercialize their 
innovation via expertise or capital, or simply engage in knowledge exchange.  
Policy option #8 is specifically focused on the European context and identifies the ever-present 
challenge of regulatory harmonization (Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2016). Clearly this topic has been 
addressed within the European Union for decades. In the financial arena it received an important 
boost with the Capital Markets Union initiative9 However, many regulatory harmonization issues 
continue to impede foreign investments. One novel idea concerns the rules of incorporation, the 
notion of developing some kind of equivalent to the Delaware C-Corp for Europe. However, any 
                                                          
recognition. The Innovation Superclusters Initiative in Canada is investing up to $950 million to support 
business-led innovation superclusters with the greatest potential to energize the economy and become engines 
of growth (https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/093.nsf/eng/home). 
8 See https://www.thec100.org/  
9 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-investment/capital-markets-union_en.  
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such initiative would require extensive cooperation among European Union members and would 
likely take a long time to be developed. In the meantime, there are many other areas of harmonization 
identified by the Capital Markets Union initiative that would also help to create a level playing field 
for investing across Europe. Canada, for example, benefited from a boost of US investments after 
getting rid of legal barriers (especially Section 116 of the Income Tax Act) that had made US venture 
investment in Canada cumbersome and costly.   
Policy option #9 concerns international networks, which involves both hard and soft policies. In 
terms of hard policies, specific funding initiatives can link the domestic companies with foreign 
investors and expertise. Backed by €410 million of EU funding, the European Investment Fund and 
the European Commission launched in 2018 a Pan-European Venture Capital Funds-of-Funds 
programme (VentureEU) to boost investment in innovative start-up and scale-up companies across 
Europe.10 This is in addition to the Pan-European Venture Capital Fund-of-Funds programme, which 
was launched in 2016 to tackle Europe’s equity gap, the fragmentation of the VC market, and to attract 
additional private funding from institutional investors into the EU venture capital asset class.11 
In addition, there are numerous soft policies that strengthen global networks. Governments 
often have direct and indirect powers to convene diverse ecosystem actors. Current examples of 
international initiatives focused on innovation and ecosystem building include Startup Genome, 
Endeavor Insight, the Tech Innovation Platform (TIP) and the Global Entrepreneurship Research 
Network (GERN). Global networking initiatives and international trade missions with a sector focus, 
such as the European Blockchain Partnership and AI Summit, may also help to promote cross-border 
investments. Finally, international conferences play a role in building global connectedness, 
including the Kauffman Fellows Annual Summit and the Web Summit. 
The last policy option #10 about transparency may be the simplest of all, yet also the least 
intuitive to many industry participants. Transparency does not come natural to the venture capital 
industry, which is traditionally opaque with regards to its portfolio performance. This model is 
currently challenged by the crowdfunding model, which is inherently much more transparent. 
However, the venture capital model continues to lack in transparency to outsiders. While this fits the 
competitive instincts of the incumbents, it also limits entry into the industry, including entry by 
foreign investors. There is a long-standing problem in the industry around the measurement and 
disclosure of investment returns, as there are few legal requirements for general or limited partners 
to disclose their returns. As a consequence, returns date remains unreliable, out-dated, and often 
biased. Yet governments and industry associations could easily take initiatives to increase the 
transparency of the industry (Nougayrède, 2018), better utilizing existing information channels, 
and/or devising novel ways of collecting industry data. This by itself would be a long-term 
investment with limited benefits in the short run, but it would help to build the credibility of an 
ecosystem, and over time generate trust with foreign investors. 
4. Discussion 
Cross-European investments, as well as US and Asian investments in Europe and abroad, are 
becoming more common. Nevertheless, policies regarding cross-border financing vary widely. To 
date, rhetoric has remained predominantly binary, where policymakers are either “for” or “against” 
policies that attract foreign VC investment. Moreover, many policy makers are simply not aware how 
their policies might implicitly encourage or discourage foreign investment. The goal of this paper is 
to introduce a nuanced approach for policymakers to make a more robust and dynamic evaluation 
of the role of government in cross-border VC investments. Our core framework identifies two broad 
types of policies: “transaction-level” policies that focus on facilitating foreign investments, and 
“ecosystem-level” policies that foster the development of the local entrepreneurial ecosystem. The 
most important insight from our work is that these two types of policies interact with each other and 
should be addressed in tandem. They should also be adjusted over time as the market develops. A 
                                                          
10 See http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/equity/news/2018/paneuropean-VC-FoF.htm 
11See http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/equity/paneuropean_venture_capital_fund_of_funds/index.htm 
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country that works to strengthen its domestic base through ecosystem-level policies can mitigate the 
adverse effects that sometimes follow transaction-level policies attracting foreign investors. 
Alternatively, a country already endowed with a strong domestic base can simultaneously create 
transaction-level policies to attract foreign investors. Our core message to policymakers is, therefore, 
that they should work concurrently on transaction-level and ecosystem-level policies. By doing so, 
policies to strengthen a country’s domestic base, as well as attract foreign investors, can work together 
to grow a healthy and sustainable VC ecosystem. 
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